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DOES ANTITRUST HAVE A COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE?
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK"

Until the 1970s antitrust law sorted all business practices into
two bins. The practices in one bin -Were declared unlawful per

se; the practices in the other were evaluated under the rule of
reason, which as a practical matter meant that they were
declared lawful per se, although the attorneys' fees incurred on
the way to the ritual absolution were a hefty tax on the lawful
conduct.
Per se rules came under attack on the ground that many of
the condemned practices might be beneficial, making summary
condemnation improvident. Since 1977 (a turning point
marked by Fortner 11,1 GTE Sylvania,2 and Brunswick) courts
have been willing to indulge explanations for conduct formerly
condemned. In 1979, in the Broadcast Music blanket-license
case, 4 the Court adapted the per se rule to rule-of-reason
analysis. That is to say, it inquired into the likely economic
effects of a practice before deciding whether it really was the
work of a cartel, or instead was beneficial to consumers. At the
same time, the rule of reason also became a testing ground for
explanations, so that in 1984 the Supreme Court finally
declared an important business arrangement illegal under the
rule of reason.5 Recent decisions continue this move from knee* Judge,
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1. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
2. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
3. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
4. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
5. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). The same Term the Court
continued what it had begun in Broadcast Music, applying a market-power filter, and
thus a goodly portion of the rule of reason, to tie-in sales, formerly the domain of per se
condemnation. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
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jerk reaction to detailed inquiry. 6 Modem antitrust law thus is a
search for economic explanations of problematic conduct. If the
explanations show the conduct efficient-and therefore
ultimately to consumers' benefit-then the court stays its hand;
if not, the court condemns the conduct.
The dominant approach puts us at risk of losing sight of the
impetus for per se rules: a belief that courts are not very good
at divining the reasons for and effects of complex business
practices, and a recognition that even when the courts can do
this, it takes a long time, during which the problem often
resolves itself.7 In corporate law the "business judgment rule"
insulates most decisions from judicial review because there is
little likelihood that systematic judicial intervention would
make investors better off. Judges' decrees would increase the
riskiness of business decisions without making decisions better.
After all, judges are not selected for business acumen and are
not penalized for bad decisions. We praise managers who hold
the stock of the firms they manage, because this aligns
managers' interests with investors' interests; managers and
investors do well or poorly together. Self-interest is a powerful
spur. A judge who bet on the astuteness of his business
judgments by holding stock in the firms that appeared before
him would be hustled off to jail. An essential ingredient of
interest alignment in the business world is an impermissible
lack of disinterest in the judicial world. So we do not trust
judges to make business decisions in corporate law. Yet
antitrust law now calls for the same sorts of economic
judgments. We ought to be skeptical of judges' and juries'
ability to give good answers. And this implies being skeptical
of antitrust itself, beyond some simple rules such as do not
collude.8
There is a large difference between corporate and antitrust
law. Mistakes in managing a corporation generally harm only
people who have elected to affiliate with the firm as investors,
6. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525
U.S. 128 (1998); California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999).
7. The ill-fated IBM prosecution (1969-82) is a good example, but only one of many.

8. For two essays that elaborate some of the ideas presented here, see Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Ignorance and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 119 (Thomas

M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992).
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suppliers, or employees. Managers who injure stockholders can
expect to receive lower compensation, if not to be given
walking papers. Blunders induce automatic penalties, to which
legal processes could add little. The "market" -to personify a
set of interactions that involve real people protecting their own
interests-is the principal safeguard of investors. But managers
who monopolize injure customers, who cannot retaliate
readily. There are no automatic penalties. These effects on third
parties justify a greater judicial role.
In deciding how much greater the role, however, we must
inquire into comparative advantage. Comparative advantage in
economics means an advantage relative to the cost of the next
best alternative. I know a lot about computers, so I can
diagnose and fix hardware problems; I may be able to do this
in less time than it takes the automation staff at the court.
Nonetheless, when my machine breaks I will turn it over to
specialists because they have a comparative advantage. If I
were to fix the computer, I would have to stop working on
opinions and articles; the cost of fixing the machine myself is
the loss of whatever else I could accomplish during the time.
The value of the hours I would surrender may well be greater
than the value (in alternative uses) of the time it takes the
computer shop to fix my machine, even if the shop takes more
time than I would. So specialists have a comparative advantage
over me in fixing computers.
Likewise, although judges may be able to fix markets when
they are monopolized, other social institutions may have a
comparative advantage. The principal competing institution is
the actions of business rivals. If there are monopoly profits to
be made, rivals enter the market (or expand their production)
and undercut the monopolist. No one doubts that this occurs.
The question is, "How long does it take?" Competition is the
long-run solution to monopoly. On rare occasions this may not
work. Unless we know that it fails, however, judges ought to
apply their talents in other fields, where they have a
comparative advantage over other institutions. And here's the
big point: by and large, we can't know when competition has
'failed."
Expressing the extent of the law's comparative advantage
over rivalry in undercutting monopoly requires the use of the
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social scientist's terms "false positive" and "false negative." If a
judge wrongly condemns as monopolistic a business practice
that is efficient and beneficial to consumers, that is a false
positive. Consumers would be better off if the judge had
decided the case the other way. If the judge wrongly excuses
conduct that is harmful to consumers, that is a false negative.
Litigation produces both false positives and false negatives.
The more complex or unusual the conduct, the more false
positives and false negatives there will be. And of course the
more complex the conduct and the scarcer our knowledge of its
consequences, the longer the case will take to conclude, and the
more it is apt to cost along the way. All the while competitors
will be trying to undercut monopolists.
For the law to have a comparative advantage, legal processes
must be able to beat market processes to a conclusion in
assessing novel business practices. If rivals will undo a
monopoly or evade a questionable practice before judges can
decide the case, there is little point in incurring the costs of
litigation and suffering the inevitable mistaken judgments. (I
make an exception for local price-fixing cartels, say in
construction markets. These may be stable and resist outside
competition because the social relations among the
conspirators enable them to resist the urge to cheat.)
If the business practices are long-lived, courts have a
comparative advantage only when false positives are few and
false negatives will survive competitive pressure. Unless there
is a strong reason to suspect that a monopoly or monopolistic
practice can survive the attempts of other firms to undermine
it, then the costs of inaction (excusing harmful conduct) are
low. Unless there is strong reason to suspect that we can
identify harmful conduct accurately, then the costs of action
(condemning beneficial conduct) are high.
The conditions for useful legal intervention may be met
when we know a lot about the practice and can condemn or
approve it out of hand. But when we know but little the risk of
error goes up, and the risk of false positives may be substantial.
People are quick to condemn what they do not understand.
Hasty or uninformed judgments may condemn novel practices
just because of their novelty. Often it takes a decade or more to
determine what a business practice really does. The law moves
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too fast for our own good, because courts act in advance of the
explanation. Judges move slower than markets but faster than
the economics profession, a deadly combination.
It may be prudent for a court to act on limited knowledge if a
mistaken condemnation can be washed away as easily as the
contrary error would be. Yet there is a bias in the errorcorrecting devices of the law. Mistakes of law are not subject to
competitive pressures. If a judge errs in saying that the
NCAA's contract with the TV networks for college football is a
violation, there is no competitive way to undermine the
decision, as there might be a competitive way to undermine the
contract. Once the court speaks, the contract is gone. If the
prohibition was mistaken, we shall suffer the consequences
indefinitely. So, too, if the Supreme Court announces a rule
such as the "filed rate doctrine," under which a cartel price is
beyond challenge if reflected in tariffs filed with the ICC, or the
rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance, there are
no automatic market pressures that test the wisdom of the rule.
Quite the contrary. After some years have gone by, the Court is
apt to declare the rule exempt from further scrutiny.9
Law has a comparative advantage over markets, then, when
legal processes are rapid, when false positives are rare (or
quickly corrected), and when markets are sluggish about
correcting false negatives. These criteria are met for naked
cartels (which may be condemned quickly and with great
assurance that condemnation is appropriate) and for large
mergers in markets with serious barriers to entry (the market
power from which may take a long time to erode through
competitive pressure). They are not met for novel business
practices-those that courts are encountering for the first time.
The rate of false positives may be particularly high because
cases arrive in court ahead of explanations for the practices. It
is easier to call practices "abuses" than to understand the real
economic effects of novel arrangements. Courts can see the
wounded plaintiffs but not the beneficiaries.
9. See, e.g., Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409, 424
(1986) (holding the "filed rate doctrine" inviolate). This is not to say that cases are never
overruled. GTE Sylvania and State Oil, referenced above in notes 2 and 6 respectively,

are among the handful. But it is to say that these overrulings are few, and that they do
not respond to market pressures. Monopoly prices are eroded because of rivals' selfinterest; there is no equivalent invisible hand in law.
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The difficulty is particularly great in the realm of
exclusionary practices. I can't talk about the Microsoft case,
which everyone else is eager to discuss, so I invite you to think
about Aspen,' 0 in which the dominant ski lift operator in Aspen
changed the terms on which a competing operator's mountain
was included in a joint, resort-wide lift ticket. Aspen effectively
reduced the rival's share of revenues from the joint ticket,
making individual-mountain tickets more attractive to the
rival. The jury found this exclusionary and illegal. We should
be very suspicious, for the simple reason that we-meaning
judges, lawyers, economists, and other professions taken
together-know very little about such joint selling
arrangements. False positives are apt to be frequent, and it is
difficult to undo mistaken condemnations. It is easy to see,
however, how a decision like Aspen could discourage
businesses from entering into beneficial joint operations for fear
that they would be exposed to antitrust liability if they should
withdraw or change the terms."
It is also frightening to contemplate businesses using liability
for competition as a justification for making or retaining
monopolistic joint arrangements-as a form of "mandatory
cartelization defense." As Professor Areeda wrote about Aspen:
"[t]he monopolist's intent to keep as much of the market as he
can for himself is not the kind of exclusionary intent that
automatically converts ordinary and useful behavior into
unlawful monopolization." 12 Antitrust law need not contain a
bias, with per se rules working only in plaintiffs' favor. If
practices that are harmful in eighty percent of the cases should
be unlawful per se, then practices that are beneficial in eighty
percent of the cases should be lawful per se. More
discriminating analysis should be reserved for the rare
intermediate case. The practice that is passed over by a rule of
per se legality, the false negative, can be taken care of by
business rivals. This is the sort of situation in which market
forces have a comparative advantage over courts.
10. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
11. This fear explains the decision in Olympia Equipment Leasing Company v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986), which read Aspen narrowly.
12. Phillip Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers,and Markets: A Century Pastand the Future,
75 CAL L. REV. 959, 965 (1987).

